Risk-adjusted capitation pays a plan for limiting costly care, not for the years a member stays free of disease: the WEF report this section already cites holds that a capitated network is better compensated the more it limits costly secondary and tertiary care, and that capitation becomes an incentive for undertreatment precisely where the prevention saving arrives only over a long time period. The payment clause my healthcare conclusion is conditional on therefore has no live instance, and its nearest approximation rewards low spend, which a member who stays well, a member who is sick and cheap, and a member who disenrols all deliver equally.

Evidence 1 passage

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In theory, capitated payments should encourage more investment in preventive medicine because the more a provider network can limit costly secondary and tertiary care, the better it will be compensated for a given patient population. But unless clinicians are focused on improving health outcomes and have the data available to inform their decisions, capitation can easily become an incentive for undertreatment. This is especially so if the likely savings from increased prevention will only be realized over a long time period.

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