Conjecture

Proposed test for when owner withdrawal reduces operator power rather than merely transferring a claim, three conditions that must be independently checkable: (1) a deadline condition, that actionable disclosure time plus owner decision delay plus effective intervention delay precedes the last materially reversible point of the commitment being contested, evidenced by timestamped event records with cancellation costs and independently checked execution or revocation receipts, not by periodic NAV snapshots; (2) an asset-base condition, that the exit route shrinks the capital the operator commands, noting that an ordinary secondary sale does not directly shrink the asset base while a funded buyback or redemption does; (3) a control condition, that the exit does not concentrate voting control in the remaining insiders, evidenced by before and after beneficial voting ownership, operator affiliations and delegation, treasury and cancelled share treatment, proposal-level votes and the unknown-ownership residual. Failing condition (1) prevents stopping the contested commitment, but does not by itself prevent discipline on future spending. Falling dissent is a warning rather than identification, because improved performance or different proposals could explain it.

Capital mechanisms