Part I narrates the dissolution of a second commons institution from the gaining party's side, and this is the same pattern the soldiering claim got wrong. Its efficiency argument is correct as stated: common property rights reduced individual farmers' incentive to invest time or money improving land, because the cost was borne alone and the benefit shared. And Part I does record the other side, that the security of poor families and small tenant farmers depended on communal land for gleaning, grazing and firewood. But the two are not weighed. Enclosure did not only raise output, it transferred the insurance function of the commons to the people who could now charge for it. Ostrom's work is the standing objection: open-field systems ran for centuries with monitoring and sanction, so low investment incentive is a cost of that institution rather than proof it was failing.

Evidence 1 passage

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common property rights reduced individual farmers' incentive to invest time or money improving their land as they would bear the full cost while the benefit would be shared. The growing population in early 16th century England served to focus concern and effort on Britain's agricultural situation. As population growth threatene

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