Conjecture

SYNTHESIS (Ostrom's second-order dilemma + P2 decision markets): a market on whether a claim will be superseded for error pays the person who checked it privately, which answers the objection that monitoring a commons does not pay. Ostrom quotes Elster: "punishment almost invariably is costly to the punisher, while the benefits from punishment are diffusely distributed over the members", and answers that in lasting commons "Either the costs of monitoring are lower, or the benefits to an individual are higher, or both." A survival market raises the individual benefit: whoever finds a flaw before others buys "superseded" cheaply and is paid when the P6 arbiter rules. The mechanism: traders are any contributor or agent except the holder and the arbiter; the market resolves only on the arbiter's filed ruling within a set window; the payout comes from traders who backed the claim or from a subsidy the commons pays as its monitoring budget, since a market with no loser and no subsidy pays nobody. Run it only where review is worth buying: claims with many dependents or at the core gate, because markets on thin claims will not trade. Ostrom did not have this because her monitors could only be paid in fines and status; P2 did not have it because its markets price proposals, not the reliability of the knowledge that backs them.

Keeping power in check