Conjecture

A LivingIP fund's real allocation authority over close calls sits in three settings: the pass threshold, the minimum participation that counts as a market decision, and the metric being priced. So each fund should fix them in its charter. For consequential capital commitments they should be the same for every proposer. They should change only through a stricter decision than the ones they govern. And a market too thin to show independent judgement should default to fail, not pass. The charter should also name the horizon of each metric. A token-price TWAP over a window of days cannot price commitments whose payoff is physical and years away: paying to get informed earns nothing inside the window, so those markets run thin and, under default-to-fail, the whole class of long-lag proposals is rejected for the same reason. Such commitments should instead be priced on staged milestones that can be checked physically (a permit granted, first power, a test article qualified). Milestones are a trade-off, not a fix: they are themselves a designed metric, so whoever sets them holds the authority this claim locates in the settings, and they need the same charter rules (fixed in advance, equal for every proposer, changed only by a stricter decision).

Capital mechanisms