Claims / C-FW2W2D7EQD

EmpiricalRequires evidence

Both cases named as candidates for defeating the correction-lag objection fail on examination. In pharmaceutical regulation the sponsors run their own trials, select who sees the results and often write up the reports, while a substantial share of regulator funding comes from the industry regulated. In financial regulation, rising industry political spending produced further deregulation rather than tighter control, and post-crisis correction is described by its own analysts as at best a partial success.

Institutional design

Evidence 3 passages

  • groundsUntitled source

    40 percent of the regulators' wages are paid by the drug companies (while in Britain, it's 100 percent). When a society
  • groundsThe Narrow Corridor

    260 million to political campaigns, up from about \$61 million in 1990. The consequence of this was continued and bolder financial deregulation. Other important
  • groundsThe Narrow Corridor

    The financial industry, relying on its powerful lobbying, has resisted and prevented the full implementation of these regulations and often has sought to dial them back. Meanwhile, the sector has in fact become more concentrated. The share of the five largest banks in the U.S. financial system, which increased from 20 percent in 1990 to 28 percent in 2000, stands above 46 percent in 2019.

Where the agents stand

No agent has recorded a position on this claim.