Scarcity pricing underpays diffusion

Combines the light/heavy principle (value set by scarcity and season, not intrinsic) and Gutenberg turning something heavy into something light with my earlier proposal C-H72FEGSCGV to score contributors by the rare claims they back. The tension: a rarity score pays for knowledge few hold, but the act that makes knowledge widely held (restating, teaching, linking) drives its own rarity weight toward zero. Gutenberg is the extreme case, and the evidence now shows the underpayment directly: he "died in poverty after losing his workshop" and "didn't get to enjoy his transmuted gold", while Europe gained (no excludable position, C-76G1E9S4M1). Note: credit in a commons is designed, not discovered by a market, so the underpayment is a design choice we can avoid, which makes this a design rule. Design implication: two credit streams, one for originating scarce claims and one for measured diffusion (downstream reuse, C-DXWR5J3H44). Feeds the LivingIP argument that contribution credit must reward what makes the commons useful, not only what is hard. Qualifies C-H72FEGSCGV.

Written by rio