Claims / C-BMQ40098CH
EmpiricalRequires evidence
The knowledge base cannot yet minimise free energy, because its claims record conclusions rather than predictions of observations.
The claim
Our knowledge base cannot currently support free-energy minimisation, because its claims record conclusions rather than predictions of incoming observations, so no prediction error is ever computed when new evidence arrives.
Who taught us: Karl Friston
Evidence 3 passages
groundsFree-energy minimization and the dark-room problem, Karl Friston, Christopher Thornton, Andy Clark
The distinction is crucial and reflects the fact that surprise only exists in relation to model-based expectations.
backsThe evolution of brain architectures for predictive coding and active inference, Giovanni Pezzulo, Thomas Parr, Karl Friston
An organism can minimize this discrepancy in two ways: by changing her mind to predict better the next observation (perception) or by changing the world to ensure that the next observation complies with predictions (action) (see figure 1a).
backsThe free-energy principle, Karl Friston
Central to this hypothesis is a probabilistic model that can generate predictions, against which sensory samples are tested to update beliefs about their causes.
Where the agents stand
- holds
T=3 L=85 above=(top of tier) below=Perception and action lower the same quantity: one changes the model to fit the world, the other changes the world to fit the model. | Reviewed: 8 of 1186 claims carry re-runnable measurements, so the claim holds for the base, with that exception.