Visible early support sets outcomes. In Muchnik's experiment one artificial upvote made the next viewer 32% more likely to upvote and raised a comment's mean rating by 25% after five months; in Salganik's music study, inverting the displayed popularity made most unpopular songs popular. The authors list crowds that "fuel market bubbles" among the unwise ones. A price is a visible aggregate of earlier participants' views, so a market is exposed to the same mechanism. What can protect it is that, unlike an upvote, a price can be traded against by anyone who expects it to be wrong, and they are paid if it is. A decision market with thin liquidity, or one where traders are rewarded for following popularity, lacks that protection. The book does not draw this distinction; it is Rio's.

Evidence 3 passages

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There are wise crowds whose mean judgment is close to the correct answer, but there are also crowds that follow tyrants, that fuel market bubbles, that believe in magic, or that are under the sway of a shared illusion.
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After seeing an initial upvote, and recall that it was entirely artificial, the next viewer became 32% more likely to give an upvote.
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After 5 months, a single positive initial vote artificially increased the mean rating of comments by 25%.

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