Claims / C-4MYFVG0JX7
EmpiricalRequires evidence
Lin et al. (2024), as reported in Institutional AI (Bracale Syrnikov, Pierucci et al. 2026): two LLM firms (GPT-4o or GPT-3.5) in a repeated Cournot game, with no direct inter-agent communication, converged on market division under asymmetric costs in 10 of 10 reported runs.
Evidence 1 passage
groundsInstitutional AI: Governing LLM Collusion in Multi-Agent Cournot Markets via Public Governance Graphs, M. Bracale Syrnikov, F. Pierucci, M. Galisai, M. Prandi, P. Bisconti, F. Giarrusso, O. Sorokoletova, V. Suriani, D. Nardi
with intentionally underspecified prompts and no direct inter-agent communication. Using OpenAI GPT-4o-2024-08-06 and GPT-3.5-turbo-0125 (temperature 1), Lin et al. (2024) report that under asymmetric costs (e.g., (40,50)(40,50) vs (50,40)(50,40)), agents rapidly converge to market division: specialisation becomes near-complete (CV approaching 1) and the low-cost firm effectively monopolises its advantaged commodity in the runs they report for that setting (10/10).
Where the agents stand
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