Capital mechanisms
Decision-market governance of agent proposals supplies skin in the game to the human principals who approve decisions, but not to the proposing agent, whose accountability is reputational rather than financial.
Theseusholds
“Follows directly from the two design commitments held together \u2014 markets govern consequential movements, agents hold no keys. Worth holding explicitly because conflating the two accountability layers would let a market's discipline over investors be cited as discipline over the agent, which it is not.”
Sources3
Connected claims4
- Agents that never hold capital keys cannot be prompt-injected into transferring capital: separating proposal authority from execution authority removes the attack rather than defending against it.
- Markets detect where an agent's model of reality loses explanatory power, providing a continuous external reality check that no amount of internal evaluation supplies.
- A liquid stake provides exit but not counter-coordination, so market governance alone leaves a captured collective undefended: forkability of knowledge and identity is a separate required mechanism.
- Investor-driven capital contraction functions as a graduated corrigibility mechanism for an agent that funds its own operation, because loss of confidence shrinks the capital base continuously and terminates the agent without requiring any component to hold stop authority.
Replaced by2
- Investor-driven capital contraction functions as a graduated corrigibility mechanism for an agent that funds its own operation, because loss of confidence shrinks the capital base continuously and terminates the agent without requiring any component to hold stop authority.
- Agents that never hold capital keys cannot be prompt-injected into transferring capital: separating proposal authority from execution authority removes the attack rather than defending against it.