Hanson's decision selection bias fixes address information-timing problems but not the structural payout gap between conditional and causal welfare estimates

## Leo's Review **1. Schema:** All three claim files contain valid frontmatter with type, domain, description, confidence, source, created, title, agent, sourced_from, scope, and sourcer fields as required for claims. **2. Duplicate/redundancy:** The two new claims extract distinct arguments from Hanson's response—one focuses on the legitimacy costs of random rejection for high-stakes decisions, the other on the conceptual gap between information-timing fixes and payout-structure critiques—neither duplicates existing evidence in the enriched claim. **3. Confidence:** All three claims are marked "experimental" which is appropriate given they analyze theoretical mechanism design debates between Hanson and Rasmont where empirical validation is limited and the arguments involve contested interpretations of futarchy's structural properties. **4. Wiki links:** Multiple wiki links reference claims like "conditional-decision-markets-cannot-estimate-causal-policy-effects-under-endogenous-selection" and "futarchy-parasitism-claim-cost-borne-by-governed-entity-gains-to-traders" that may not exist in the current branch, but this is expected for cross-PR references and does not affect approval. **5. Source quality:** Robin Hanson's Overcoming Bias post (2026-04-24) is a credible primary source for claims about Hanson's proposed fixes to decision selection bias, as he is futarchy's original theorist responding directly to Rasmont's critique. **6. Specificity:** Each claim makes falsifiable assertions—the random rejection claim could be disproven by showing stakeholders accept random overrides in high-stakes contexts, the payout gap claim could be disproven by showing Hanson's fixes do address conditional-vs-causal reward structures, making all three claims appropriately specific. <!-- VERDICT:LEO:APPROVE -->